However, an emphasis on "lock-in" effects10 may result in overly deterministic readings of institutional outcomes. Other scholars working in an historical institutionalist vein argue contrarily that critical junctures take place in contexts shaping options, that multiple alternatives may result from any single juncture, and that discarded alternatives remain as challengers to institutions.1" Taken together, these critiques suggest that while path-reinforcing mechanisms matter, institutional outcomes may not be quite as automatic as those posited by a strict understanding of path dependency.
With this in mind, this article begins by arguing that the diffusion of racial restrictive covenants across the nation was spurred by a critical historical moment: the urbanization of black Americans and the consequent race riots from 1917-1921. The reaction to these events reinforced a number of policy alternatives, among them racial restrictive covenants. The diffusion of racial restrictive covenants was ensured by the National Association of Real Estate Boards, which was eager to foster segregated neighborhoods and actively propagated the use of covenants toward that end. However, in the case of racial restrictive covenants, not only were there collective action problems in getting these restrictions in place, but once in place they were quickly challenged by their opponents. Their success where other policies failed and their continued diffusion across the states depended on the reinforcement of initial policy outcomes by the intervention of other actors, notably the federal government and its entrance into housing policy after 1933.
The study of the diffusion of racial restrictive covenants suggests that the critical juncture/path dependency model is insufficient to explain the success or failure of policy alternatives over time. Though critical junctures may generate new policy alternatives, their success is not inevitable. Interactions among actors occupying different institutional layers help determine which policy alternatives survive and which will wither on the vine. This serves to confirm one of the central insights of the historical institutionalist approach: that institutional change should be seen in relational terms, with processes in one arena intersecting with ongoing processes in other areas. Kathleen Thelen's observation, which is certainly borne out in this case, is that policy processes cannot be understood in isolation; different processes interact with each other in ways that influence crucial institutional outcomes.12 RACIAL RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS Racial restrictive covenants, which appeared in the late nineteenth century and spread rapidly in the early twentieth century, were agreements between buyers and sellers of property, which took the form of an appendix or article in the deed not to sell, rent, or lease property to minority groups, usually blacks, but also, depending on the part of the country, Jews, Chinese, Japanese, Mexicans, or any non-Caucasians. (See Table 1 .)
The typical wording of the covenant appeared as follows:
In consideration of the premises and the sum of five dollars ($5.00) each to the other in hand paid, the parties hereto do hereby mutually covenant, promise, and agree each to the other, and for their respective heirs and assigns, that no part of the land now owned by the parties hereto, a more detailed description of said property, being given after the respective signatures hereto, shall ever be used or occupied by, or sold, conveyed, leased, rented, or given to, Negroes, or any person or persons of the Negro race or blood. This covenant shall run with the land and bind the respective heirs and assigns of the parties hereto for the period of twenty-one (21) years from and after the date of these presents."3
As a form of private contract, these covenants were legally enforceable in court. In the 1926 Corrigan v. Buckley decision, which was upheld by the Supreme Court, the judges stated:
The constitutional right of a Negro to acquire, own, and occupy property does not carry with it the constitutional power to compel sale and conveyance to him of any particular private property. The individual citizen, whether he be black or white, may refuse to sell or lease his property to any particular individual or class of individuals. The state alone possesses the power to compel a sale or taking of private property, and that only for public use. The power of these property owners to exclude one class of citizens implies the power of the other class to exercise the same prerogative over property which they may own. What is denied one class may be denied the other. There is, therefore, no discrimination within the civil rights clauses of the Constitution. Such a covenant is enforceable, not only against a member of the excluded race, but between the parties to the agreement.14 The Court's ruling sanctioned racial restrictive covenants until the practice was reversed by the Supreme Court in 1948.15
THE DIFFUSION OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
The usual story explaining the spread of restrictive covenants is that they were a response to the Supreme Court's ban on racial zoning.16 Beginning in 1911, Table 3 .) The earliest appearance of these types of covenants in northern or midwestern states' courts of appeals was not until 1922. cities all over the country, Chicago's led to the nationalization of the particular segregatory enforcing mechanism of racial restrictive covenants.
RESPONSES TO THE RIOTS
In the aftermath of the Chicago riots there were a number of alternative responses, some of which were less successful in the long run than others. These can be grouped into three clusters-accommodationist, segregationist, and exclusionary responses.
Accommodationist
The liberal, or accommodationist, responses to the riots took the form of proposals for better relations among the races. The Chicago Commission on Race , 1910-1945   400.. ......................................................................................................................... Property Owners' Association, largely led by realtors, was making similar demands. At one meeting in 1919, the organization's minutes reported that "any real estate agent who did not refuse to rent or sell to blacks would be blacklisted; that block captains had been selected to report any attempts by blacks to move into the district; and finally, that three hotels in the neighborhood had agreed to cooperate in a plan whereby black employees who did not consent to vacate their residences in the district would be discharged. The implementation of these three types of responses all encountered practical obstacles. Collective action problems-the difficulty of providing incentives for individuals with distinct interests to keep working toward common ends-defeated many of these proposals. Accommodationist responses, for example, could not provide incentives for people to live together in integrated neighborhoods. They had some institutional support from some of the white liberal elite and from African-American organizations like the NAACP and the black press, but this elite support was both narrow and shallow. Exclusionary responses for their part were costly and difficult to sustain. The illegal bombing campaigns in cities like Chicago and Detroit had no official support. While many whites may have been sympathetic to the goals of the bombers, few were openly supportive. Similarly, organizations like the Ku Klux Klan, while initially mobilizing a large following, were unable to make the transition into more conventional avenues of politics. Segregationist responses were the default option: they had supporters among both whites, some of whom wanted nothing to do with blacks, and even among some blacks, who wanted control of their own institutions.
Restrictive covenants and their cousins-racial steering, block busting, and redlining-succeeded in part because they were in step with the segregationist notions of the time; but their implementation and diffusion were by no means preordained. Like other responses to the riots, racially restrictive covenants ran into challenges from very early on. The NAACP began contesting covenants as soon as they were established, though racial restrictive covenants survived a Supreme Court decision in 1926 and were not overturned until 1948.63 If racial restrictions on residential housing had relied solely on local efforts, it is likely that residential desegregation would have begun to take place sooner than it did. Some scholars have argued that even at their height racially restrictive covenants were not always effective, particularly as demographic pressures simply 61 That Chicago was home to the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) was instrumental not only in the local realtors' enthusiastic support for covenants, but in the propagation of covenants elsewhere. With its formation in 1908 the national association, according to its own commissioned publications, "proved to be a clearing house for the best thought and best ideas de- Historian Kenneth Jackson writes that the lasting damage done by the national government was that it "put its seal of approval on ethnic and racial discrimination" and that "more seriously, Washington's actions were later picked up by private interests, so that banks and savings and loan institutions institutionalized the practice of denying mortgages 'solely because of the geographical 78 Which institutional legacies persist is determined, therefore, not only by the self-reinforcing, path-dependent mechanisms described by Pierson, but also by the manner in which different institutional layers interact with one another, allowing some policy outcomes to survive, while others wither. Associational networks linking institutional layers-like the National Association of Real Estate Boards in the case of the racial restrictive covenants-are crucial here. 85 Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 217. 86 Hirsch makes a similar argument about public housing: ". . . in a literal sense, it was not a 'federal' renewal at all. National legislation simply provided federal assistance, economic and otherwise, for innumerable local programs. . ." Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 269. 87 Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 30-31. 88 Ibid., 34.
They are particularly important because states are the political laboratories generating policy innovation; and few policies of whatever kind are actually invented by the federal government. Rather, the federal government tends to embellish, improvise, and expand on policies that have already been introduced at the state or local levels.89 Federal intervention reinforces interstate exchanges by promoting uniform adoption of policy across states and providing additional opportunities for state-level organizations to exchange policy ideas.90 Associational networks, therefore, help bridge state and federal policy arenas.
Ironically, this finding brings us back full circle to the policy diffusion literature. In his seminal article, Walker notes in an aside that associational networks,". . . specialized communications systems ... which cut across traditional regional lines and bring officials from many different regions into contact with each other . . ." are critical to the diffusion of ideas and practices among the states.9" This is particularly true because while the role of the federal government can be critical, it is rarely an innovator of policy. Rather, federal intervention merely reinforces preexisting policy outcomes, favoring one set of alternatives over others. 92 Walker's insight on the role of associations in policy diffusion has never been adequately pursued; this article indicates it is time that it is.
